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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the through-the-cycle rating concept; basically, we try to specify its 
main characteristics, focusing on the differences with point-in-time ratings. We also 
discuss the effects of this methodology on the prediction power of default probabilities, on 
the stability of those ratings, and their impact on the capital requirements that emerge 
from Basel II, in terms of their potential procyclicality. On the other hand, we argue how 
predictable rating changes are, and the ability of the agencies to look through the cycle 
when assigning qualifications. Based on that, we conclude about the way that economical 
fundamentals must be incorporated in rating calculations. We estimate a panel data model 
with random effects ordered probit, using data for the period 1997-2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(*) Any opinion expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not correspond to the 
institutional opinion of the Central Bank of Uruguay. 
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I. Introduction 
 
A sovereign rating is an assessment about a government’s ability and willingness to repay 
its debt both in principal and interests on time. 
This paper attempts to identify sovereign rating’s fundamentals for the two main agencies: 
Standard and Poors and Moody’s. For that purpose, we have constructed a vast database, 
which contains the credit ratings for 104 countries, as well as the fundamentals of those 
ratings for the period 1997-2007. 
 
The document is organized as follows. Section II discusses the through-the-cycle approach 
used by the agencies to assign sovereign ratings. Specifically, we analyze the 
methodology’s ability to predict default probabilities, the stability of resulting ratings and 
the potential procyclical effects that capital requirements could have because of it. 
Moreover, we discuss about how predictable rating changes are, and if agencies help when 
looking through the cycle. In section III we present the methodology and data used to 
estimate sovereign ratings. In particular, we use a panel data random effects ordered 
probit. We consider macroeconomic variables as well as institutional ones, like quality of 
public institutions. The results are showed in section IV. Finally, conclusions driven from 
the analysis are presented in section V.  
 
II. Through-the-cycle ratings 
 
II.1 What is a through-the-cycle rating? 
 
Credit ratings are used for different purposes; they are used for debt pricing, to calculate 
capital requirements, and to calibrate internal ratings used by financial institutions, 
particularly banks. 
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When using credit ratings, two conditions should be satisfied. The first one is to have a 
deep knowledge of the nature of through-the-cycle (TTC) ratings, and what kind of 
information they attempt to provide. The second is to be aware of how well agencies 
reflect the information they want to give to the agents. 
 
Among all critics made to rating agencies, the fact that they fail to reveal information 
properly, because of their slow reaction, is the most frequent. Altman and Kao (1992) as 
well as Lando and Skodeberg (2002) have pointed that there is a positive autocorrelation 
between rating changes (a downgrade is followed by successive downgrades and vice 
versa). One possible explanation is that agencies are dosing bad news, therefore benefiting 
debt issuers, who are in fact their clients. Another widespread critic is related to their 
performance during Asian crisis (1997-1999).  
 
Given that beliefs about rating agencies, two questions arise. The first rising question is up 
to what extent the criticism does not derive form the methodology used to calculate credit 
ratings. The second question we attempt to answer is if rating agencies can, in fact, look 
through the cycle. When providing information, their limited ability to provide added 
valued to information could explain why they “arrive late”.  
 
To shed some light on those issues, we based on the articles of Loffler (2004), Altman and 
Rijken (2005) and Loffler (2005), as well as some concepts published by Standard and 
Poors (2006). 
 
It is important to begin by presenting a first definition of through-the-cycle (TTC) rating, 
and its differences with point-in-time (PIT) ones.  
A TTC rating attempts to measure the credit quality in a long time horizon, incorporating 
the cyclical aspects of the economy. Agencies affirm that countries with solid economic 
fundamentals – with investment grade qualifications – rarely will be affected by cyclical 
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factors, unless the cycle is substantially different from what one could expect from the 
history.  
 
A PIT rating evaluates credit quality in a short time horizon, usually one year. This 
methodology is used by many banks when applying scoring methods (like discriminant 
analysis or logit models). They are all based on the arbitrage that should exist between 
debt markets and equities markets. The KMV model is an example of PIT rating. It is based 
on the expected default frequency (EDF) calculation, with a one-year horizon. The EDF 
depends on the capital structure of the firm, the assets return volatility and the current 
value of those assets. The academic precedent of KMV is Merton model of 1974. The 
Moody’s purchase of KMV model is a sign of TTC and PIT methods complementary. 
  
If we calculate ratings with a TTC perspective, a first problem emerge: how to distinguish if 
an issuer’s fundamental change if transitory or permanent. Taking into account that 
ratings are forward looking, and that economic cycles don’t appear exactly in the same 
way, the work of agencies must deal with an important difficulty. Treat a shock as 
permanent when it was transitory could lead to wrong decisions when assigning a credit 
rating.  
In the same way, considering a negative shock as transitory when it is in fact permanent 
will lead to a show reaction of the agency, derived from the use of TTC methodology. That 
kind of situations results in comments such as “they are always late, far from market 
fundamentals, and they are also procyclical”. In section II.5 we discuss this point.  
 
In line with the previous considerations, how does a credit rating evolve during the cycle?  
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Graph 1: Credit rating evolution 
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In a context in which the cycle’s amplitude was not excessively large, and the investor had 
an investment grade qualification, the TTC rating will not be affected by the short term 
conditions. In contrast, a PIT rating will suffer discrete changes.  
 
If the cycle’s size is important, and the investors were rated below investment grade, TTC 
ratings could incorporate, gradually, the cycle phase in which the economy is.  
 
Graph 2: Credit rating evolution – incorporating cyclical aspects 
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In theory, TTC rating could be established as the average rating, if we were certain about 
the nature of the cycle, and about the fact that it will repeat the same characteristics in the 
future, as Graph 2 shows. The problem is the uncertainty about the size of the cycle, 
particularly in non-investment-grade countries with pronounced cycles. In this case, 
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agencies opt for a gradual incorporation of the cycle, as they doubt, unlike investment-
grade countries, about the ability of the country to pay its obligations on time.  
 
Therefore, an economic policy implication for developing countries is the smoothing of the 
cycle, through the adoption of anti-cyclical policies. Even there is consensus about this 
point, it is difficult to implement because of its potential political costs. Besides the 
benefits associated with these policies, such as reducing output volatility, it has a strong 
impact on the value of the debt and their rating.  
 
II.2  Default prediction power 
 
Credit ratings are used to infer default probabilities, by observing historical frequencies of 
defaults for every notch.  We can find an application of this in CreditMetrics model, and 
also in the Basel II accord in which ratings are used as an input to calculate regulatory 
capital.  
 
It is widely accepted that default probabilities that emerge from TTC methodology could be 
significantly improved. As mentioned before, Moody’s purchase of KMV shows that 
agencies adhere to that vision. There exists consensus about the advantage that PIT 
measures have in measuring short term default probabilities. However, that measures 
present great volatility. In contrast, TTC ratings are more stable, although short term 
default probabilities are substantially improvable.    
 
There is therefore a trade off for all rating’s user. On the one hand, investors want ratings 
to reflect recent changes in default risk, even if they are likely to be reversed within a year.  
On the other hand, they want to keep their portfolio rebalancing as low as possible, so 
they need some stability in ratings. From a regulator point of view, there is a desire that 
institutions have enough capital to cover inspected losses related to credit risk, but, at the 
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same time they do not want capital requirements to be procyclical. If that were the case, 
banks expand credit in good times and contract them in recession, thus amplifying 
economic cycle. This could lead to a liquidity crisis, like recent sub prime crisis in US 
mortgage market.   
 
Procyclicality could affect institutions which establish lines limit based on expected losses 
instead of exposures. They could be highly volatile, given the high volatility that default 
probabilities present. As a consequence, in bad times, default probabilities are higher and 
banks must reduce exposures to accomplish their limits. If that were the case for all 
financial system, we would confront an illiquidity situation, so the cycle has been 
amplified.  
 
Reaching this point, it must be remembered that both approaches are complementary. One 
needs short term default probabilities to properly manage risk, but also should evaluate 
long term credit risk and its volatility along time. Thus, we need short term default 
probability but also its future pattern. 
 
To mention an example, in a currency swap o interest rate swap, credit risk exposures are 
low in short term, but time pattern is highly volatile. In interest rate swaps it can be shown, 
under some assumptions, that the maximum exposure occurs in T/3, where T is maturity 
of the swap. Then the exposure decreases because of the mean reversion property.   
 
In a currency swap, there’s no mean reversion, as notional values that are exchanged at 
the end of the life of the swap are different, so exchange rate risk prevails. Exposures 
increases continuously over time, and the peak exposure occurs at the end of the life of 
the swap.  
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Previous examples show the importance of having an indicator of long-term default 
probability, as well as its variability over time.  
 
II.3 Rating changes are predictable 
 
As we have mentioned before, statistical analysis found that there exists positive 
autocorrelation in rating changes.  
Here we present some possible explanations:  
• Bad news is announced in a parsimonious way, to benefit debt issuers, who are after 
all their clients.  
• Agency treated a shock as transitory; as there is uncertainty about the permanence 
of the shock, analysts could suggest reflecting it partially in credit rating. Then, 
when they are certain about the shock permanence, the downgrade is done 
completely. The correlation is positive. 
• If the company is expanding to risky sectors, she may need to have a higher 
leverage. Even when the analyst is aware of that higher risk, it won’t be totally 
incorporated in credit rating if the horizon of analysis is shorter than the company’s 
strategy horizon. Therefore, one should expect to see successive downgrades.  
To conclude, rating’s positive autocorrelation could be seen as a result of the method used 
to calculate them, or also as an agency problem, which arises from the behavior or 
agencies which react slowly to adverse information, to benefit clients. There is no 
definition about which effect prevails.  
 
II.4 Can agencies look through the cycle? 
 
Something widely recognized by agencies is that looking through the cycle is not an easy 
task. It could be the reason why they don’t use that approach to calculate internal ratings. 
From an academic point of view, it is difficult to distinguish between a cyclical and a 
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permanent component of a cycle, for example in stock prices, even when considering large 
high-frequency time series.   
 
Taking into account previous sections analysis, it seems that the added value of rating 
agencies is to look through the cycle. So a pertinent question is how efficiently they can do 
that. 
This particular issue was studied by Loffler (2005). The author proposes a strategy to 
analyze agencies ability to look through the cycle, which can be summarized as follows: 
• Estimating one-year default probabilities from market data. 
• Based on that, estimate long-run trend of those default probabilities, using 
Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
• Then, verify if agency’s ratings help to explain the long-run trend estimated before. 
• He concludes that ratings do help to identify long-run trend in default probabilities, 
so agencies can effectively look through the cycle. 
 
The paper verifies that ratings explains a three-year centered moving average computed 
over months -18 to +18 even after controlling for an uncentered moving average 
computed over months -18 to 0. Finally, he founds that the low variability in TTC ratings is 
in line with the low variability in long-term trends.  
 
II.5. Rating agencies: are they always late?  
 
“Rating agencies are always late, procyclical and are not in accordance with market 
fundamentals”  
If we want to analyze that criticism properly, it could be useful to make some 
considerations:  
The Rating Agencies' Through-the-cycle Methodology: an application to sovereign ratings 
 
 
 
9 
• The fact that they are not in accordance with market fundamentals is something 
that is at the core of their methodology. If they look through the cycle, they don’t 
want to measure current default probabilities.  
• Their late reaction could be attributed to the problems that this approach has when 
taking it to practice. As we have mentioned, considering a shock as transitory when 
it was permanent could be a serious problem. Also agency problems arise because 
of the nature of the relationship between rating agencies and issuers.  
• If they are late, because of considering a shock as transitory when it was permanent, 
then they will be necessarily procyclical. In that case, they still are less procyclical 
than PIT measures.  
 
II.6 Impacts of TTC approaches to estimate sovereign ratings 
 
Taking in consideration previous sections, some aspects about sovereign rating estimation 
can be established: 
• Current information is important to explain credit ratings, but is not enough.  
• Given that ratings are forward looking and through the cycle, one must analyze how 
the economy is going to performance in the future, and during economic cycles.  
• To deal with previous point, we have only historical information. One must infer 
from previous cycles how the next ones are going to be.  
• Related to the first aspect, to estimate long-term trend of the economy we need its 
past trend. That’s why when estimating sovereign ratings it is usual to take the 
average of macroeconomic fundamentals, as an indicator of future trend of the 
economy.  
• In view of what we said in section II.1, investment-grade countries should be treated 
different from non-investment ones. In particular, cyclical effects won’t affect the 
former while they do will have an impact in the last ones.  
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The next sections will incorporate all this aspects, when estimating sovereign rating 
models.  
 
III. Determinants of sovereign ratings  
 
III.1. Methodology: random effects ordered probit 
 
As we have mentioned before, sovereign ratios are an assessment about the willingness 
and the ability of a government to repay his obligations on time, both principal and 
interests. Ratings are ordinal, and offer a qualitative measure of relative likelihood a 
country will default on its obligations. Considering that the relationship between rating 
notches is not linear, using traditional OLS methods could be inappropriate, as they 
assume that the difference between qualifications AAA y AA+ is the same as the difference 
between BBB- y BB+. For that reason, we choose an ordered probit context, where the cut-
off points that divide each category are estimated by the model. We also use panel data 
techniques. Its main advantage is that it allows for more sample variability than cross-
section or time series analysis, by considering both temporal and spatial dimensions. Thus, 
by containing information on both intertemporal dynamics and the individuality of entities, 
it also controls the called unobserved heterogeneity; unobservable factors that affect a 
country’s credit rating will impact in its qualification in every period.  
 
 We could start by noticing that each agency makes an evaluation of a country’s 
creditworthiness that depends on a set of variables, stated in the next equation. 
  
itiiit uaZXR it +++= λβ
*  
 
where *itR  is the evaluation of the agency about the creditworthiness of a country i  in 
period t, and is an unobserved latent variable. itX  contains time varying explanatory 
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variables that will be described below and iZ  are time invariant regressors, in general 
dummy variables. The term ia  is the unobserved effect for each country, which could be 
thought as variables that agencies consider when assigning a rating, but can not be 
measured directly. As an example, think about country’s reputation or structural 
characteristics that result in higher or lower ratings, independently of macroeconomic 
fundamentals. Lastly, disturbances u it  are assumed to be independent across time and 
countries.  
 
Agencies define several cut-off points that define the rating category assigned to a 
country. The final rating will then be given by: 
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There are two approaches to estimate model’s parameters: 
1) Fixed effects model, where ia  are treated as parameters to be estimated along with 
β, without specifying any assumption about the relationship between ia  and Xit. 
2) Random effects model, where ia  are consider as a random variable, specifying a 
density function.  
In the first case, joint estimation of ia  and β results in the incidental parameters problem; 
as the number of groups tends to infinity, the number of parameters to be estimated 
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increases as well, so estimators are not consistent. The second approach assumes that the 
correlation between the observed explanatory variables and the unobserved effect is zero.  
0)()/( == iii aEXaE   
The choice depends on whether ia  could be thought as having non correlation with the 
explanatory variables. Taking into account that fixed effects estimator is not consistent, 
random effects estimation seems to be more attractive.  That estimation implies complex 
calculations, but econometric software Stata incorporates a command to estimate 
parameters in a relatively fast and precise way (Fréchette, 2001). 
 
So the random effects model supposes:  
 
[1] [ ] [ ] [ ]itiitiiti acFadFajRob ///Pr ,,, −==  
[2] itR  are independent conditional on ii aX ,  
[3] ),0(/ 2aii NXa σ≈  
 
Assumption [3] implies that ia  and xit are independent, and  ia  is normally distributed.  
Under assumptions [1] to [3], β, 2aσ  and the cut-off points ( jµ ) can be estimated by 
conditional maximum likelihood. As Wooldridge (2002) points out, because the ia  are not 
observed, they cannot appear in the likelihood function. Instead we find the joint 
distribution of (Ri1, Ri2,…., RiT) conditional on xi, a step that requires to integrate out ia . 
Since ia  distributes normal ),0(
2
aσ ,  
[ ] [ ] iaia
T
t
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where    itijtiitijti aXdyaXc −−=−−= − ,,,1, '' βµβµ  
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The vector of parameters θ includes β, 2aσ  and the cut-offs, jµ . The likelihood function can 
be maximized with respect to β, 2aσ  and the cut-offs, to obtain N -consistent 
asymptotically normal estimators. Butler and Moffitt (1982) describe a procedure for 
approximating the integral before. A more detailed analysis is presented in Appendix I. 
 
If one can not assume that correlation between the unobserved effect and the regressors is 
zero, the relationship between them could be modeled. Chamberlain (1980) allowed for 
correlation between ia  and xit, assuming a conditional normal distribution with linear 
expectation and constant variance,  
 
),(/ 2bii XNXa σξϕ +≈  
 
Where X  is the average of itx , t=1…T and 
2
bσ  is the variance of ia  in equation 
ii bXa ++= ξϕ . Afonso, Gomes and Rother (2007) postulate this kind of model when 
identifying rating determinants. They state that the expected value of the country-specific 
error is a linear combination of the time averages of the regressors Xi 
 
iiiti XZXaE η=),/(  
 
Starting from the initial equation,  
 
itiiit uaZXR it +++= λβ
*  
 
where iti Xa εη += , we obtain: 
 
itiiiit uXZXR it ++++= εηλβ  
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If we add and subtract iXβ  in the previous equation, we obtain the next expression:  
 
itiiiiit uZXXXR it +++++−= ελβηβ )()(  
 
We can identify short-run effects, β, which includes the effect of cyclical or temporal 
deviations respect to historical averages (trend). We also estimate long-term effect, η+β, in 
which there are structural factors that determine the long-run trend in credit rating. In 
terms of the discussion stated in section II, this model gathers the through the cycle 
characteristic of rating estimations, as well as cyclical factors that could affect the rating 
assignment.  
 
In this paper we estimate a random effects ordered probit model, using the stata command 
reoprob that Fréchette (2001) has developed. In next section we describe the explanatory 
variables to be included in the model; these variables are selected to reflect the TTC 
character of credit ratings, and to take into account short-term factors that agencies could 
look at as well. We also differentiate between developed and advanced economies, given 
that agencies seem to consider different variables for each one. As an example, reserves 
and external debt, which are relevant for emerging countries, are not so important when 
assigning advanced economies rating. Lastly, we estimate a model which allows for 
correlation between regressors and the unobserved, like proponed by Afonso, Gomes y 
Rother (2007). 
 
III.2. Data 
A set of variables have been selected to measure ability and willingness to pay of a country 
as well as indirect factors that also affect that concepts. When assigning a credit rating, 
Standard & Poor’s1 considers the following factors:  
                                            
1
 Calificaciones Crediticias Soberanas: Un resumen, 2006 
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• Political institutions and trends, and their impact in effectiveness and transparency 
of political environment, public security and geopolitical issues. 
• Economic structure and growth perspectives. 
• Income flexibility and public expenditure pressure, fiscal deficit, general 
government debt and contingent claims of financial system and public enterprises.  
• Monetary flexibility 
• External liquidity and non resident liabilities of both public and private sector.  
 
In the same line, Moody’s2 recognizes that quantitative measures are only a part of the 
input into sovereign rating decisions; they are necessarily backward looking, while 
sovereign analysis requires forward looking evaluation of default probability over a 
medium to long-term horizon. In addition, qualitative aspects are unavoidable: as Moody’s 
states “sovereign risk analysis is an interdisciplinary activity in which the quantitative 
analytical skills of the analysts must be combined with sensitivity to historical, political and 
cultural factors that do not easily lend themselves to quantification”. 
 
As Moody’s points out, economic and financial variables can vary according to the level of 
development of a country. The weight assigned to each variable depends on whether they 
are looking to an advanced economy, with a story of institutional stability, or at a 
developing country where is still undergoing structural changes.   
Data is divided into four broad categories:  
• Economic structure and performance 
• Government finance 
• External payments and debt 
• Monetary, external vulnerability and liquidity indicators 
                                            
2 Moody’s Statistical Handbook - Country Credit- Nov 2007 
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Finally, as we are evaluating long-run creditworthiness, when there is more uncertainty, we 
will take into account specific risk factors associated with the aspects that we measure, 
which may affect the economy in long term. Basically, we want to include a measure of 
indicators’ volatility, as a forward looking variable which capture the magnitude of cyclical 
variations of the economy over time.  
 
We have identified the following variables as possible determinants of sovereign ratings:  
 
a. GDP per capita: indicator of a country’s development, they give an indication of the 
relative command over resources in international commerce possessed by the 
average individual. If GDP per capita is low, it is more likely that the country won’t 
pay its debt. We take three-year average of this variable, in US dollars. Source: 
Moody’s (2007). 
b. Real GDP (% change): a country that cannot grow fast enough to absorb a growing 
labor force, reduce unemployment, alleviate poverty, and provide its citizens with 
rising living standards can be subject to deepening social conflict and political 
instability. Highly indebted countries with large external financing requirements 
need higher GDP growth to keep pace with their debt service burden. We only find 
relevant this variable in case we are analyzing developing economies, as the real 
GDP growth loses relevance to GDP per capita in an advanced country. Three-year 
average will be taken. Source: Moody’s (2007). 
c. Inflation rate: it can be seen as an indicator of public policies quality, and could 
indicate difficulties in financing public expenditure. Also it affects debt dynamic as 
the government faces a higher nominal interest rate. We take three-year average of 
CPI percentage of change. Source: Moody’s (2007). 
d. Government primary balance/GDP: the ability of government to extract revenues 
from the population of taxpayers and users of services are key factors to determine 
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if they will be able to make full and timely payments of interests and principal of 
outstanding debt. High fiscal deficits indicate difficulties in obtaining resources, and 
so a higher default probability. A three-year average is taken. Source: Moody’s 
(2007). 
e. Current account balance / GDP: large and persistent current-account deficits can 
lead to a buildup of external debt, thus generating more vulnerabilities and a higher 
default probability. As in previous variables, we consider a three-year average. 
Source: Moody’s (2007). 
f. External debt/ GDP: the higher this ratio, higher debt burden relative to the ability 
of generating income. There is a direct relationship between this indicator and 
default risk. We consider this variable only in case of being a developing country, as 
it was the case for real GDP change, and we took three-year average. Source: Joint 
External Debt Hub. 
g. Public debt/ GDP: we consider total government debt, held by residents and non 
residents, as total public indebtedness could help explaining why some countries 
default on their external debts at seemingly low debt thresholds3. Three-year 
average is taken, and only for emerging countries. Source: World Bank. 
h. Official Foreign Exchange Reserves / GDP: indicates a country’s liquidity; the higher 
the level of reserves, the higher the likelihood of repaying on time. We will take the 
current value of this ratio, based on the idea that what it matters at the moment of 
assigning credit rating is actual liquidity level, and like real GDP growth and external 
debt we consider liquidity only for developing countries. Source: Moody’s (2007).  
 
                                            
3 See article by Reinhart y Rogoff (2008). 
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i. Dollarization ratio: is measured as the percentage of total deposits in domestic 
banks that is denominated in foreign currency. According to Moody’s, dollarization 
reflects public’s perception of the credibility of government fiscal and monetary 
policies and can itself be a source of additional risk. The relationship between this 
ratio and default probability is therefore direct. We consider this variable to be 
relevant only in case of emerging economies, and we took three-year average. 
Source: Moody’s (2007). 
j. Credit history: it will be measured by a dummy variable which will take the value of 
1 since the year in which the country defaulted on its debt and 0 if the country have 
never defaulted on its obligations. Sources: Moody’s, S&P 
k. Overall risk score: is a quantitative assessment of the risk that an economy will face 
in a two-year horizon. Several risks are considered, each one with an assigned 
weight: a) political risk (22%), b) economic policy risk (28%), c) economic structure 
risk (27%) and d) liquidity risk (23%). This index is constructed by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit4. It can be seen that it is a forward looking variable, which is 
relevant when evaluating future creditworthiness. Given the nature of this indicator, 
it is reasonable to take its current value in the estimation. 
l. Political stability index: reflects the perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including domestic violence and terrorism. This indicator is provided by World 
Bank5, and take values between 0 and 100; the higher the value, the better the 
situation in terms of political stability. Thus we expect a positive influence of this 
index on credit ratings.   
 
                                            
4 EUI Data services, The Economist 
5 Worldwide Governance Indicators, World Bank, http://www.govindicators.org 
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m. OECD membership: dummy variable which take value of 1 in case the economy is an 
OECD member. 
n. European Union membership: dummy variable which take value of 1 in case the 
economy belongs to that zone, and 0 in other case.  
We have an unbalanced panel, which includes observations from 1997 to 2007; the graph 
below shows the number of countries considered in each year, with their correspondent 
Moody’s credit rating.  
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As we can see in Graph 3, the number of countries with sovereign rating increases with 
time. The same happens with Standard and Poor’s ratings, as presented in Graph 4. 
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In general the ratings attributed by the three main agencies are quite similar. Table 1 
shows rating differences between Moody’s, Standard & Poors and Fitch. As we can see, 
nearly 90% of ratings differ in only one notch, and almost all observations have a distance 
of two notches vis-à-vis the other two agencies. It is also interesting to notice that S&P y 
Fitch have much closer ratings.  
 
Table 1: Rating comparison between the three main agencies 
Difference S&P-Moodys S&P-Fitch Moody's-Fitch
(notches)
-5 1 0 0
-4 10 0 1
-3 11 0 3
-2 59 26 38
-1 169 130 155
0 479 475 479
1 155 108 169
2 38 12 59
3 3 0 11
4 1 0 10
5 0 0 1
Total 926 751 926
1 notch 86,72% 94,94% 86,72%
2 notches 97,19% 100,00% 97,19%  
 
IV. Results 
 
IV.1. Results for Moody’s ratings 
 
IV.1.1. Ordered probit model 
In this section we present the results obtained by the estimation of the equation stated in 
previous section, by fitting a random effects ordered probit model, using stata software. 
Table 2 shows the estimation output.  
 
The first part of the table reports coefficients associated with each variable, their Standard 
deviation and their significance level. As Table 2 shows, all coefficients are highly 
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significant. In the low part of the table cut-off points are presented, which will determine 
the assigned rating in each case.  
It is remarkable how the smoothing character of TTC ratings is confirmed by the 
estimation: inflation rate, primary balance, GDP per capita, external and public debt, 
dollarization and real GDP variation resulted significant taken as three-year averages. If 
during the last three years a country has shown high levels of inflation, the rating will be 
lower; at the same time, a positive primary balance over the three previous years is 
associated with a higher rating; GDP per capita also presents a direct relationship with 
ratings. So we can conclude that agencies smooth cycles when assigning a sovereign 
rating, as three-year average for variables are more explicative. It should also be 
mentioned that when incorporating current values of variables, much of them become non 
significant, and the whole model has a lower prediction power.   
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Table 2: Estimation for Moody’s 
Random Effects Oredered Probit
Log l ikel ihood = -978.02334 Number of obs  = 784
LR chi2(13) = 774.74
Prob > chi2 = 0,0000
rating Coef. Std. Err. z P>│z│
eq1
pr_infl -0.0212584 0.0044123 -4.82 0.000 -0.0299065 -0.0126104
defaul t -2.045386 0.1605276 -12.74 0.000 -2.360015 -1.730758
pr_bce gob 0.0439442 0.0109456 4.01 0.000 0.0224912 0.0653973
pr_gdppc 0.002116 0.0000105 20.13 0.000 0.000191 0.0002322
overal l ri s k 0.0384583 0.0054116 7.11 0.000 0.0278517 0.0490649
miembroOECD 1.340319 0.1469886 9.12 0.000 1.052226 1.628411
pols tabi l i ty 0.0262533 0.0027849 9.43 0.000 0.0207951 0.0317115
ue 1.342494 0.1476182 9.09 0.000 1.053167 1.63182
deudaext -0.0215754 0.0021557 -10.01 0.000 -0.0258005 -0.0173502
deudapca -2.077392 0.1927691 -10.78 0.000 -2.455213 -1.699572
l iquidez 2.677184 0.4412461 6.07 0.000 1.812357 3.54201
pr_dolarizac -0.0120771 0.0020901 -5.78 0.000 -0.0161736 -0.0079806
crecimientoreal 0.1331479 0.0157207 8.47 0.000 0.1023359 0.1639599
_cut1
_cons -2.950313 0.3841195 -7.68 0.000 -3.703173 -2.197453
_cut2
_cons -1.702831 0.3590259 -4.74 0.000 -2.406509 -0.9991534
_cut3
_cons -0.4847677 0.3427856 -1.41 0.157 -1.156615 0.1870796
_cut4
_cons 0.909901 0.3443818 2.64 0.008 0.2349251 1.584877
_cut5
_cons 1.627715 0.3460817 4.70 0.000 0.9494072 2.306023
_cut6
_cons 2.383957 0.352715 6.76 0.000 1.692648 3.075265
_cut7
_cons 3.48188 0.3625066 9.61 0.000 2.77138 4.19238
_cut8
_cons 4.593652 0.3756784 12.23 0.000 3.857336 5.329969
_cut9
_cons 5.451542 0.3940634 13.83 0.000 4.679192 6.223892
_cut10
_cons 6.582655 0.4154291 15.85 0.000 5.768429 7.396881
_cut11
_cons 7.292742 0.42322 17.23 0.000 6.463246 8.122238
_cut12
_cons 8.630856 0.4464978 19.33 0.000 7.755736 9.505976
_cut13
_cons 9.663565 0.4673775 20.68 0.000 8.747522 10.57961
_cut14
_cons 11.01071 0.5082483 21.66 0.000 10.01456 12.00686
_cut15
_cons 12.40735 0.5450525 22.76 0.000 11.33907 13.47564
_cut16
_cons 13.21913 0.5632134 23.47 0.000 12.11525 14.323
rho
_cons 0.845485 0.0110496 76.52 0.000 0.8238283 0.8671418
95% Conf. Interva l
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Another aspect to be remarked is that deudaext, deudapca, dolarización and 
crecimientoreal where included only for developing countries; this is based in the 
discussion presented in section II, where we claimed that agencies look at different 
variables when analyzing advanced economies, which are more stable. So we included 
those variables multiplied by a dummy which took value of 1 when the economy is defined 
as emerging and zero when it was an advanced economy6. By this segmentation, the 
variables we mention before resulted more significant that in the case of being consider 
for the entire sample. The hypothesis of a different treatment for emerging countries is 
thus reinforced.  
 
Exceptions to the three-year average variables are liquidity, overall rating score 
(overallrisk) and the political stability index (polstability). In the first case, one can think 
that liquidity (measured as the level of reserves as a proportion of GDP) matters in current 
terms, as it reflects directly the ability to pay during the period. The overall rating score 
(overallrisk) is forward looking indicator, so it seems logical to consider it in its current 
level. Finally, the political stability index reflects actual political risk so it is reasonable to 
take it in current values and not smoothing it by including minor risks that a country may 
has suffered in the past.  
 
Lastly, dummy variables of OECD and EU membership where significant and with a positive 
coefficient, thus indicating that the sole fact of being a member of that groups leads to 
higher ratings.  
 
Last raw of Table 2 report the value of rho, the correlation coefficient of composite errors 
(0.85). As we mentioned above, rho indicates that there exists a positive and high 
correlation in credit ratings, thus reaffirming the TTC methodology used by agencies, 
                                            
6 We used de International Monetary Fund classification of emerging countries, stated in the World Economic 
Outlook Report, April 2008. 
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which generates a slow reaction to shocks, driven by de uncertainty about the permanence 
of them. The value of rho is also related to higher predictability of ratings; if we observe a 
downgrade, it is expectable to observe subsequent downgrades.  
 
Moreover, rho can be seen as the relative importance of the unobserved effect7. Thus 
estimation results are indicating that the importance of the unobserved is high. Non-
measurable aspects of a country affect strongly its qualification. To mention an example, 
see the cases of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) that we present in Table 3. Model 
predictions are below ratings assigned by Moody’s, which could be a signal that 
unobserved effects are prevailing. The hypothesis8 for these countries is that they have an 
important growth potential, and they may become among the four most dominant 
economies by the year 2050. This could help explaining why Moody’s credit rating is above 
our estimations. Brazil is the only one classified below our estimations, and this could be 
attributed to the fact that it is a Latin-American country, which counts as a negative factor. 
Nevertheless, in 2008 Brazil has reached investment grade in S&P rating (Baa3 note in 
Moody’s) 
 
Table 3: BRIC countries 
Moody's Ord. Prob. Moody's Ord. Prob. Moody's Ord. Prob. Moody's Ord. Prob.
1999 B2 Ba1 A3 Baa3 Ba2 Ba2 Ba3 Caa
2000 B1 Ba1 A3 Baa3 Ba2 Ba3 B3 Caa
2001 B1 Ba1 A3 Baa3 Ba2 Ba2 Ba3 B2
2002 B2 Ba1 A3 Baa3 Ba2 Ba3 Ba2 B1
2003 B2 Ba1 A2 Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Baa3 B1
2004 B1 Ba1 A2 Baa3 Baa3 Ba2 Baa3 B1
2005 Ba3 Ba1 A2 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 Baa2 Ba3
2006 Ba2 Baa3 A2 Baa2 Baa2 Ba1 Baa2 Ba2
2007 Ba1 Baa3 A1 Baa2 Baa2 Ba1 Baa2 Ba1
China India RussiaBrazil
 
 
 
                                            
7 See Appendix I. 
8 Goldman Sachs, 2003 
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Finally, relative weights of each variable in final qualification are presented in next table. 
We differentiate between advanced and emerging economies. 
 
Table 4: Relative weights for Moody’s ratings 
Variable Developing Advanced
pr gdp 3 16,3% 0,0%
pr infl 3 -4,2% -0,4%
DEFAULT -9,4% 0,0%
pr deuda pca/GDP prom 3 -23,8% 0,0%
pr bce primario gob./GDP 3 1,2% 0,5%
reservas/pib 13,9% 0,0%
pr dolarizacion 3 -8,3% 0,0%
pr GDP per capita 3 24,5% 44,6%
pr extdebt -28,9% 0,0%
overall score 72,5% 22,1%
miembro OECD 3,8% 8,2%
political stab 36,7% 18,8%
UE? 5,7% 6,1%
Total 100,0% 100,0%  
From Table 4 we conclude that few variables are enough to categorize an advanced 
economy; the most important are GDP per capita, as a direct indicator of the ability to pay. 
In developing countries, variables related to macroeconomic fundamentals and political 
stability have a positive influence and higher weights; GDP per capita has a lower weight 
than it has in advanced economies. The most important negative factors are debt 
indicators, dollarization ratio, credit history and inflation rate.  
 
The previous analysis has two limitations. The first one is that the relative weight is 
influenced by the selected sample. If there were too many countries that defaulted on their 
debts during 1999-2007, the weight assigned to that variable will be higher. Anyway, we 
have selected a broad sample that is representative enough to consider the weights as 
valid. A second limitation is that coefficient signs are ambiguous out of the scale extremes. 
That is, estimated signs are valid if we consider P(R=1/x) or P(R=17/x), but for 
intermediate results the direction of the effect is not clear.  
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IV.1.2. Prediction power 
The model predicted actual ratings within three notches in 94.3% of all observations.  Next 
matrix shows the differences between predicted and real ratings assigned by Moody’s for 
the entire sample. Appendix II contains a matrix for every year of analysis.  
 
Table 5: Fitted vs. Actual ratings for Moody’s – period 1999-2007 
Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Caa Total
Aaa 104 27 18 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 160
Aa1 17 5 4 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32
Aa2 2 3 9 15 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30
Aa3 2 2 7 4 3 11 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 34
A1 1 0 2 8 6 11 6 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36
A2 0 0 0 5 8 18 14 7 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 58
A3 0 0 1 1 11 18 4 5 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 46
Baa1 0 0 0 0 0 6 9 11 10 13 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 52
Baa2 0 0 0 0 0 3 17 12 2 6 6 4 1 0 0 0 0 51
Baa3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 9 10 20 8 6 2 0 0 0 60
Ba1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 8 7 5 11 7 18 1 0 0 62
Ba2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 11 11 5 11 6 0 0 0 49
Ba3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 5 5 3 10 6 0 1 34
B1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 15 5 7 20 3 5 0 61
B2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 9 6 6 17 7 1 4 51
B3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 6 10 10 5 1 37
Caa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 4 6 11 6 8 42
rating estimado - probit ordenado
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g 
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IV.2. Results for Standard and Poor’s ratings 
 
IV.2.1. Ordered probit model 
 
We estimated the same model presented in IV.1, using S&P credit ratings. Results are 
reported in the following table.  
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Table 6: Estimation for Standard and Poor’s 
Random Effects Oredered Probit
Log l ikel ihood = -852.3496 Number of obs  = 722
LR chi2(13) = 730.32
Prob > chi2 = 0,0000
rating Coef. Std. Err. z P>│z│
eq1
pr_infl -0.0173308 0.0044655 -3.88 0.000 -0.0260831 -0.0085786
defaul t -0.9884433 0.2047952 -4.83 0.000 -1.389835 -0.5870521
pr_bce gob 0.0509758 0.0117885 4.32 0.000 0.0278707 0.0740808
pr_gdppc 0.001621 0.00000975 16.63 0.000 0.000143 0.0001812
overal l ri s k 0.0744385 0.0060448 12.31 0.000 0.0625909 0.0862862
miembroOECD 2.068894 0.1646576 12.56 0.000 1.746171 2.391617
pols tabi l i ty 0.0454842 0.0044008 10.34 0.000 0.0368587 0.0541097
ue 1.747541 0.1514906 11.54 0.000 1.450624 2.044457
deudaext -0.0393246 0.0036703 -10.71 0.000 -0.0465183 -0.0321309
deudapca -2.739734 0.250942 -10.92 0.000 -3.231572 -2.247897
l iquidez 5.520121 0.5388487 10.24 0.000 4.463997 6.576245
pr_dolarizac -0.0286078 0.0024714 -11.58 0.000 -0.0334517 -0.023764
crecimientoreal 0.1516054 0.0203948 7.43 0.000 0.1116323 0.1915785
_cut1
_cons -1.931375 0.4054163 -4.76 0.000 -2.725976 -1.136774
_cut2
_cons -0.6557382 0.3764501 -1.74 0.082 -1.393567 0.0820905
_cut3
_cons 0.5404365 0.3813125 1.42 0.156 -0.2069223 1.287795
_cut4
_cons 1.580577 0.3962216 3.99 0.000 0.8039966 2.357157
_cut5
_cons 2.704466 0.4310089 6.27 0.000 1.859704 3.549228
_cut6
_cons 4.038832 0.4345022 9.3 0.000 3.187224 4.890441
_cut7
_cons 5.118375 0.4246512 12.05 0.000 4.286074 5.950676
_cut8
_cons 6.402558 0.4306125 14.87 0.000 5.558573 7.246543
_cut9
_cons 7.590334 0.4520891 16.79 0.000 6.704256 8.476413
_cut10
_cons 8.567809 0.477089 17.96 0.000 7.632731 9.502886
_cut11
_cons 10.12095 0.5104188 19.83 0.000 9.120546 11.12135
_cut12
_cons 12.42014 0.5898821 21.06 0.000 11.26399 13.57629
_cut13
_cons 14.14658 0.6520214 21.7 0.000 12.86865 15.42452
_cut14
_cons 15.0938 0.6588152 22.91 0.000 13.80254 16.38505
_cut15
_cons 15.83079 0.6755453 23.43 0.000 14.50674 17.15483
_cut16
_cons 17.69715 0.7295665 24.26 0.000 16.26722 19.12707
rho
_cons 0.8054669 0.0139438 57.77 0.000 0.7781376 0.8327962
95% Conf. Interva l
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All coefficients are significant, and have the expected signs. It is noticeable that the 
coefficient associated with liquidity is higher that in Moody’s case, and also coefficients of 
institutional variables. This estimation also reports a high value of rho, so the same 
comments made for Moody’s are valid.  
 
Relative weights are shown in next table, considering the division between emerging and 
advanced economies.  
 
Table 7: Relative weights for S&P ratings  
Variable Developing Advanced
pr gdp 3 10,8% 0,0%
pr infl 3 -2,0% -0,2%
DEFAULT -2,6% 0,0%
pr deuda pca/GDP prom 3 -18,2% 0,0%
pr bce primario gob./GDP 3 0,8% 0,5%
reservas/pib 16,5% 0,0%
pr dolarizacion 3 -11,4% 0,0%
pr GDP per capita 3 10,9% 26,2%
pr extdebt -30,5% 0,0%
overall score 81,3% 32,7%
miembro OECD 3,4% 9,7%
political stab 36,8% 25,0%
UE? 4,3% 6,1%
Total 100,0% 100,0%  
 
In general, we obtained similar results that in Moody’s estimation.  
To asses an advanced country’s creditworthiness a few variables are enough. We observe 
that overall risk score is the most important, followed by GDP per capita and political 
stability index.  
In emerging economies, we found that risk factors associated with macro economical 
fundamentals (real GDP growth, reserves, GDP per capita) and the quality of political 
institutions contribute positively to credit rating. Negative factors are indebtedness 
indicators and dollarization ratio, as in the case of Moody’s.  
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IV.2.2. Prediction power 
 
In this case, the model predicted actual ratings within three notches in 93.4% of all 
observations, a slightly lower percentage than in Moody’s estimations. Next table shows 
the results for the entire period9: 
 
Table 8: Fitted vs. Actual ratings for S&P – period 1999-2007 
Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Caa Total
Aaa 68 43 11 7 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 131
Aa1 12 13 6 10 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44
Aa2 0 3 7 9 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27
Aa3 2 6 2 4 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23
A1 3 8 0 2 7 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26
A2 0 0 0 4 25 27 5 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 67
A3 0 0 0 0 11 24 22 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 66
Baa1 0 0 0 0 0 15 8 4 6 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 39
Baa2 0 0 0 0 2 5 7 5 12 5 3 4 0 0 0 0 0 43
Baa3 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 6 11 5 10 3 3 0 0 0 0 43
Ba1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 4 3 5 4 13 4 1 0 0 38
Ba2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 9 5 13 13 11 0 0 0 53
Ba3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 12 9 3 9 2 0 0 42
B1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 5 5 6 8 5 5 1 0 39
B2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 7 7 7 11 4 3 3 45
B3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 7 4 8 4 7 38
Caa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 6 20
rating estimado - probit ordenado
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IV.3. Asymmetrical treatment of cycles: the region 
In this section we make a brief comparison of predicted ratings obtained in the ordered 
probit regression with Moody’s actual ratings for Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil. Next table 
presents the results.  
 
                                            
9 See Appendix II which contains per-year results. 
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Table 9: Rating comparison within the region 
Moody's Ordered Probit Moody's Ordered Probit Moody's Ordered Probit
1999 B1 Baa3 B2 Ba1 Baa3 Ba1
2000 B1 Ba1 B1 Ba1 Baa3 Ba1
2001 Caa B1 B1 Ba1 Baa3 Ba1
2002 Caa B3 B2 Ba1 B3 B1
2003 Caa Caa B2 Ba1 B3 B1
2004 Caa Caa B1 Ba1 B3 B1
2005 B3 B2 Ba3 Ba1 B3 Ba3
2006 B3 B1 Ba2 Baa3 B1 Ba1
2007 B3 Ba3 Ba1 Baa3 B1 Ba1
Argentina Brazil Uruguay
 
As we can see from Table 9, credit rating for Argentina did not change during the next 
three years after 2001’s crisis. Estimations are in line with this pattern, although it 
presents a lag in the initial downgrade prediction. This could be attributed to the three-
year average of variables we took in our model, thus having the crisis stronger impact 
some years later. In that sense, we confirm the TTC hypothesis, and also we notice how 
agencies react immediately when something as strong as Argentinean crisis emerge. 
Moreover, as agencies do not know the deepness of the cycle they maintained Argentina’s 
credit rating although the economy was performing well, thus generating differences with 
estimated ratings. Therefore, unobserved effects may explain the bias towards lower 
ratings: Argentina’s reputation as a debtor is playing a major role when assessing its 
creditworthiness.  
 
According to the model, Brazil could have obtained investment grade in 2006. Again, 
uncertainty about the character of shocks (in terms of their permanence) made that Brazil’s 
investment grade come in 2008, when S&P assigned a BBB- to that country. They have 
probably considered that stability and growth are consolidated for this economy, and also 
Brazil’s reputation as a debtor, which is far better than Argentinean one.   
 
Lastly, the model predicted Uruguayan’s loss of investment grade before Moody’s 
downgrade. The reputation effect can help explaining why that agency downgraded 
Argentina while maintaining Uruguayan credit rating at investment grade levels. It appears 
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again the relevance of emerging countries cycles, given that Uruguay has shown a 
sustained growth during last years and Moody’s continues assigning a B1 category, which 
could be higher according to economic fundamentals. Doubts may come from the fact that 
Uruguay’s GDP growth is above its long-term trend during last five years, so can we think 
about a permanent change in cycle’s pattern or it is only temporal? The answer to this 
question is implicit in TTC methodology.  
 
Giving previous results, one can establish the hypothesis that there exists an asymmetrical 
behavior of agencies when looking at emerging economies cycles. In the low phase of the 
cycle, given that they have been historically deep, agencies do not hesitate to downgrade 
countries and do not wait until being sure about the permanence of the shock; in the case 
of Uruguay during1999-2001 the rating was not downgraded because the starting point 
was investment grade and having that category implies that the country can successfully 
face adverse shocks. In contrast, when being in a high phase of the cycle agencies do not 
reflect that immediately in credit rating, until they are certain about the change in long-run 
default probabilities.  
 
IV.4. Modeling unobserved effects 
 
We have constructed a database with the same variables presented in section III.2, in the 
same way they are presented in the article of Afonso, Gomes and Rother (2007). We took 
averages for all the period, as well as current deviations from that historical trend. We also 
maintained our differentiation between advanced and developing countries.  
Results are presented in Table 10, and they are in line with previous estimations. Primary 
balance was not significant, neither in its historical average nor its deviation from that. 
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External debt only was significant in historical terms (average). Lastly, we included real 
GDP growth for all the observations.10 Signs are the expected ones. 
  
This model also reflects the TTC character of ratings, incorporating PIT elements as well 
(given by deviations from historical averages). Predicted ratings lie within three notches in 
95% of the observations. Table 11 presents the comparison for the entire period.  
 
Finally, we also observed a high value of rho, so the same comments we did before about 
it are pertinent. 
 
                                            
10 When we included GDP growth only for emerging countries, the model showed a lower prediction power.  
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Table 10: Modeling short-term and long-term effects – Moody’s 
Random Effects Oredered Probit
Log l ikel ihood = -1185.7683 Number of obs  = 939
LR chi2(13) = 955.64
Prob > chi2 = 0,0000
ra ting Coef. Std. Err. z P>│z│
eq1
pr_i nfl -0.0776872 0.0058741 -13.23 0.000 -.0892002 -0.0661741
defa ult -2.059023 0.1530492 -13.45 0.000 -2.358994 -1.759052
pr_gdppc 0.0001929 0.00001 19.26 0.000 0.0001733 0.0002126
gdppc 0.0001837 0.0000132 13.97 0.000 0.0001579 0.0002095
pr_overal l ri s k 0.0446077 0.0075619 5.90 0.000 0.0297867 0.0594288
overa l l ri s k 0.0886686 0.0138571 6.40 0.000 0.0615091 0.1158281
miembroOECD 2.453632 0.1710623 14.34 0.000 2.118356 2.788908
pr_pols tabi l i ty 0.0328529 0.0030041 10.94 0.000 0.026965 0.0387408
pols ta bi l i ty 0.024366 0.0057997 4.20 0.000 0.0129989 0.0357332
ue 1.981594 0.1499131 13.22 0.000 1.68777 2.275419
l i quidez 4.472347 0.8418351 5.31 0.000 2.822381 6.122314
pr_l i quidez 4.975547 0.4960219 10.03 0.000 4.003362 5.947732
pr_deuda ext -0.0369748 0.0024973 -14.81 0.000 -0.0418694 -0.0320801
deudapca -2.242422 0.333687 -6.72 0.000 -2.896437 -1.588407
pr_deudapca -0.4924737 0.2284561 -2.16 0.031 -0.9402394 -0.044708
dola rizacion -0.0081952 0.0042203 -1.94 0.052 -0.0164668 0.0000763
pr_dola rizacion -0.0090983 0.0021839 -4.17 0.000 -0.0133786 -0.004818
var gdp 0.0458673 0.0122825 3.73 0.000 0.021794 0.0699406
pr_var gdp 0.0686704 0.0245879 2.79 0.005 0.020479 0.1168618
_cut1
_cons -2.299454 0.5102547 -4.51 0.000 -3.299534 -1.299373
_cut2
_cons -1.36915 0.4998201 -2.74 0.006 -2.34878 -0.3895211
_cut3
_cons -0.3180306 0.4980558 -0.64 0.523 -1.294202 0.6581409
_cut4
_cons 0.945916 0.4998809 1.89 0.058 -0.0338326 1.925664
_cut5
_cons 1.784683 0.5038805 3.54 0.000 0.7970959 2.772271
_cut6
_cons 2.607389 0.510089 5.11 0.000 1.607633 3.607145
_cut7
_cons 3.801927 0.5144784 7.39 0.000 2.793568 4.810286
_cut8
_cons 5.105915 0.520107 9.82 0.000 4.086524 6.125306
_cut9
_cons 5.894664 0.5314844 11.09 0.000 4.852974 6.936354
_cut10
_cons 6.847084 0.5419829 12.63 0.000 5.784817 7.909351
_cut11
_cons 7.497589 0.5453972 13.75 0.000 6.42863 8.566547
_cut12
_cons 8.738879 0.5648395 15.47 0.000 7.631813 9.845944
_cut13
_cons 9.820345 0.5794421 16.95 0.000 8.684659 10.95603
_cut14
_cons 11.51524 0.6049493 19.04 0.000 10.32956 12.70092
_cut15
_cons 13.0703 0.6308774 20.72 0.000 11.8338 14.30679
_cut16
_cons 14.10008 0.6477357 21.77 0.000 12.83054 15.36962
rho
_cons 0.7478912 0.0156212 47.88 0.000 0.7172743 0.7785081
95% Conf. Interval
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Table 11: Predicted vs. Actual ratings– long-term and short term distinction. (Moody’s, 1999-2007) 
Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Caa Total
Aaa 103 6 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 114
Aa1 17 3 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26
Aa2 5 1 9 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16
Aa3 3 3 2 8 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18
A1 1 2 7 7 5 8 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33
A2 0 0 6 8 10 6 6 7 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 49
A3 0 0 0 8 15 3 3 3 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36
Baa1 0 0 0 3 0 5 4 16 9 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39
Baa2 0 0 0 0 3 3 13 7 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 35
Baa3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 3 3 6 10 5 0 0 0 0 34
Ba1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 4 6 12 10 5 9 0 0 0 52
Ba2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 15 7 11 1 0 0 0 42
Ba3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 6 5 0 0 0 16
B1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 3 5 10 3 4 0 34
B2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 2 12 5 8 1 4 38
B3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 9 5 3 3 22
Caa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 3 1 2 9 13 35
rating estimado - probit ordenado
ra
tin
g 
M
oo
dy
's
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V. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have analyzed the determinants of sovereign ratings, using data from the 
two main agencies for the period 1997-2007. We have found three main indicators of TTC 
characteristic. First, variables were significant taken as three-year averages. Althoug some 
exceptions appeared, they were specifically for emerging countries where cycle’s deepness 
affect short-term ability to pay. Secondly, the variable overall risk was highly significant, 
measuring potential risk in a two-year horizon. This is a forward looking variable, which 
can be seen as a proxy of the economy’s volatility. Notice the resemblance between this 
risk store and the volatility presented in Merton’s model (1974) to measure default 
probability. Finally, parameter ρ  took values between 0.75 y 0.85 in estimations; this 
could be interpreted as the relative importance of the unobserved effect, associated with 
individual aspects which affect qualifications, thus reflecting the subjective aspect of rating 
assessment. Another interpretation of ρ  is correlation between error terms; a high value 
of this parameter is consistent with the TTC methodology, as it is not an easy task to 
identify the permanence of the shock. In general, with negative shocks and emerging 
economies, agencies react faster than in case of positive ones; the treatment is thus 
asymmetrical. This may explain why we said that rating changes are predictable; it is 
enough to observe previous movements.  
 
The existence of a TTC methodology also impacts from a regulatory point of view. Capital 
requirements used in standardized approach of Basel regulation are based in external 
ratings calculated by these agencies; in this sense, capital requirements will be TTC as 
well. The transition to internal models like proponed in Basel II Accord (Internal Rating 
Based Approach - IRB) could lead to more volatile requirements, given that the principal 
input for the IRB model, that is default probability, is usually estimated by institutions 
using PIT models. Moreover, capital requirements would become procyclical, increasing in 
recessions and thus deepening credit crunch. There is a trade-off between rating stability 
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and proper reflect of current risk. Considering that TTC and PIT approaches are 
complementary, one possible solution will be using PIT default probabilities when 
managing credit risk, while using a TTC one in case of calculating capital requirements, 
avoiding amplifying cyclical effects. As we can see, when analyzing transition to Basel II 
application it becomes really useful to have a deep knowledge of each approach.  
 
In relationship with rating determinants, there are three aspects to be remarked. Firstly, we 
have found traditional macro economic fundamentals as determinants of sovereign ratings. 
On the one hand, GDP per capita, primary balance, liquidity and real GDP growth with a 
positive influence and on the other hand inflation, indebtedness and dollarization having a 
negative impact. As we mentioned before, these variables were taken as three-year 
averages, thus reaffirming TTC hypothesis11. Besides those variables, we have identified a 
strong impact of institutional factors, measured in the political stability index. The relative 
weight assigned to that variable was of 36.7% in case of emerging economies, and 18.8% 
for advanced ones. Additionally, we found the overall risk score, a forward looking variable 
which reflect general risk of a country, having a high weight in developing (72.5%) as well 
as advanced economies (22.1%). Credit history captured in default variable negatively 
affects ratings; previous defaults increase default probability in future. Lastly, estimation 
indicates that being a member of EU and OECD gives a higher credit rating.  
 
An important contribution of this paper is to have estimated a model in which we can 
differentiate variables according to the kind of country we are analyzing (in terms of its 
development). In contrast to other papers where separated models are estimated, the 
inclusion of a dummy variable to distinguish developing economies allows for 
incorporating the entire simple in a single model, thus increasing model’s precision and 
providing a better understanding of which variable impacts which kind of countries, or 
which one affects all of them.  
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For emerging economies, two remarkable economic policy implications arise. On the one 
hand, dollarization’s negative impact suggests that agencies perceive bimonetary countries 
as particularly vulnerable to exchange rate movements. Moody’s claims that this risk is 
evaluated when analyzing Baa1 or less categorized countries, as it increases credit and 
liquidity risk from a banking system perspective. As a mitigating factor, we can mention 
the level of reserves, which becomes a crucial variable for emerging countries12. Second 
implication relates to the cyclical component of GDP variations, and its relevance when 
assigning credit ratings. The need for anti cyclical policies has been reinforced by the 
analysis.  
 
Predicted ratings for Uruguay are near investment grade. Moody’s assign a B1 qualification 
(three notches below our predictions) while S&P gives Uruguay a slightly higher note, BB- 
(two notches below). As we have pointed out, uncertainty about the size of the cycles 
makes that despite the excellent evolution of Uruguayan economy during last years, its 
sovereign rating remains in relative low levels. Based on IMF projections for Uruguay13, we 
obtained a prediction for the credit rating in next years. Basically, with real GDP growth of 
3.8% and 3.2% for years 2008 and 2009 respectively, an inflation ratio of 6.2% and 5.5%, a 
decrease in external debt ratio to 45.1% and 41.7%, and a primary balance of 4%, the 
model predicts the achievement of investment grade for years 2008 and 2009. The 
maintenance of the good evolution of macro economical indicators and the consolidation 
of economic growth are thus crucial, as they will reduce agencies uncertainty about the 
cycle. Given that Moody’s rating is far below investment grade, we can not affirm that 
Uruguay will obtain it in next years. The same exercise has been done for S&P ratings, 
obtaining similar results: prediction indicates that investment grade would be achieved in 
2009.  
                                                                                                                                                  
11 Liquidity is the exception as we are interested in current ability to pay.  
12 A more detailed analysis can be found in Moody’s (2003) document. 
13 Fondo Monetario Internacional -  Febrero 2008 – IMF Country Report Nro 08/45 
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Finally, given the high costs associated with rating assignment and its in situ revision, 
agencies use similar models to the one we presented in this paper to monitor credit risk. 
They have even published some of them – Moody’s (2004). In that sense, all the research 
done in this area can help in knowing how agencies form their opinion, and may give a 
useful tool in case of arguing with them about an assigned rating.  
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Appendix I: Some issues related to the estimation approach 
 
I.1 The likelihood function 
The model we want to estimate can be written as follows:  
 
TtNiXR ititti ...,.........2,1;,.......2,1'
*
, ==+= εβ  
 
ititi au += ,,ε  
 
[ ]2;0 ai Na σ≈  
 
[ ]1;0, Nu ti ≈  
 
It is assumed that tii uanda ,  are independent and identically distributed, and both are 
uncorrelated with regressors Xit. 
Under those assumptions: 
 
[ ] 2, 1 atiVar σε +=  
 
We named the correlation between individual’s errors as ρ . In this case, we can define ρ  
as follows: 
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In that way, ρ measures the relative importance of the variance of the unobserved effect 
with respect to total variance, that is, 21 aσ+ . 
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Variable tiR ,  can take values from 0 to J – in present model, we have J=17. 
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Thus we can state that: 
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Defining itijtiitijti aXdyaXc −−=−−= − ,,,1, '' βµβµ  in case jR ti =, , and taking 
∞+=∞−=− Jand µµ 1 , we can write previous probability as:  
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Likelihood function can be expressed as: 
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The difficulty in this problem is the evaluation of the T-fold integrals. Moreover, previous 
probability is conditional on the value of the unobserved ,ia . Thus we integrate out ,ia , 
taking into account that [ ]2;0 ai Na σ≈ . 
Considering that  tiu ,  is identically distributed across time, we have: 
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We know that [ ]2;0 ai Na σ≈ , so we  can standardize [ ]iaf  in previous equation. Taking  
a
i
i
a
z
σ
=  we can write: 
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Where f (.) and F (.) represent normal density function and normal cumulative distribution 
function respectively. 
 
Using results from Butler and Moffitt (1982), Frechette (2001b) shows that one can 
compute first derivatives of likelihood function with respect to the model’s 
parameters ρµβ ,, j . 
This can be improved upon since the first derivatives can also be approximated by Gauss–
Hermite quadrature.  
 
Moreover, likelihood function which took the form:  
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With: 
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The likelihood function can also be approximated by the Gauss Hermite quadrature. 
 
I.2  Parcial derivatives 
 
In general, derivative with respect to the estimating parameters θ  can be expressed as in 
the following way: 
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Using Leibnitz integral rule: 
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Notice that [ ] [ ]tijjtitijjti xFFxff ,,,, ';' βµβµ −=−=  and that function { }tiy ,1  takes value 
of 1 if the expression in parenthesis is true and 0 if it is false.  
 
When deriving with respect to rho, one must take into account that: 
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I.3 Optimization routine 
 
Gauss-Hermite quadrature is used to calculate integrals of the form: 
[ ] [ ]dxxfx∫
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The next approximation formula is used:  
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En is an error term.  
 
As we can observe, likelihood function obtained before has this form, and also its 
derivatives with respect to interest parameters. 
The evaluation points of f(x) are the roots of the Hermite polynomial. After calculating 
those roots (xi), weights wi are obtained by solving a linear equation system (such as 
Vandermonde’s). 
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Appendix II – Predicted vs. Actual ratings 
 
 
Moody’s – 1999 
 
Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Caa Total
Aaa 7 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
Aa1 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Aa2 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Aa3 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
A1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A2 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
A3 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Baa1 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
Baa2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Baa3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 7
Ba1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 3 0 2 2 1 0 0 0 13
Ba2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 4
Ba3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 4
B1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 2 2 1 0 0 8
B2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 3 0 1 1 8
B3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 3
Caa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 3
ra
tin
g 
M
oo
dy
's
rating estimado - probit ordenado
 
 
Moody’s – 2000 
Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Caa Total
Aaa 8 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
Aa1 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Aa2 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Aa3 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
A1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A2 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
A3 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Baa1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
Baa2 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Baa3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 9
Ba1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 8
Ba2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 5
Ba3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 3
B1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 2 1 2 0 1 0 10
B2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 0 0 1 6
B3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 5
Caa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3
ra
tin
g 
M
oo
dy
's
rating estimado - probit ordenado
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Estimated r ting – rdere  probit 
Estimated rating – rdered probit 
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Moody’s – 2001 
 
Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Caa Total
Aaa 8 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13
Aa1 3 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Aa2 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Aa3 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
A1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
A2 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
A3 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Baa1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Baa2 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
Baa3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 9
Ba1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 7
Ba2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 6
Ba3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 0 0 5
B1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 2 0 1 0 7
B2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 1 0 1 7
B3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2
Caa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 2 6
ra
tin
g 
M
oo
dy
's
rating estimado - probit ordenado
 
 
 
Moody’s - 2002 
 
Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Caa Total
Aaa 9 5 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20
Aa1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Aa2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Aa3 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
A1 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
A2 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
A3 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Baa1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Baa2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Baa3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 8
Ba1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 0 0 0 5
Ba2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 6
Ba3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 4
B1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 6
B2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 1 0 1 7
B3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 1 0 0 5
Caa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 3
rating estimado - probit ordenado
ra
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Moody’s – 2003 
 
Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Caa Total
Aaa 10 4 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20
Aa1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Aa2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Aa3 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
A1 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
A2 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
A3 0 0 0 1 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Baa1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Baa2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 7
Baa3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5
Ba1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 1 0 0 6
Ba2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5
Ba3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 0 4
B1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 1 0 5
B2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 3 1 0 0 7
B3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 3
Caa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 1 2 7
ra
tin
g 
M
oo
dy
's
rating estimado - probit ordenado
 
 
Moody’s – 2004 
 
Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Caa Total
Aaa 13 2 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20
Aa1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Aa2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Aa3 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
A1 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
A2 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
A3 0 0 1 0 2 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
Baa1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Baa2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 7
Baa3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6
Ba1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 5
Ba2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 6
Ba3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2
B1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 1 0 0 7
B2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 3 0 0 7
B3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 3
Caa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 2 6
rating estimado - probit ordenado
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Moody’s – 2005 
 
Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Caa Total
Aaa 15 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20
Aa1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Aa2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Aa3 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
A1 1 0 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
A2 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
A3 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Baa1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
Baa2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 5
Baa3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 4
Ba1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 6
Ba2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 5
Ba3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 4
B1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 6
B2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 4
B3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 0 5
Caa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 2 1 0 6
ra
tin
g 
M
oo
dy
's
rating estimado - probit ordenado
 
 
 
Moody’s – 2006 
 
Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Caa Total
Aaa 17 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21
Aa1 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Aa2 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Aa3 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
A1 0 0 1 0 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
A2 0 0 0 1 0 1 5 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
A3 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Baa1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Baa2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 5
Baa3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6
Ba1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 5
Ba2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 6
Ba3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 4
B1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 0 0 0 6
B2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
B3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 0 0 6
Caa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 4
ra
tin
g 
M
oo
dy
's
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Moody’s – 2007 
 
Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Caa Total
Aaa 17 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22
Aa1 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Aa2 2 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Aa3 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
A1 0 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
A2 0 0 0 0 1 4 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
A3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Baa1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Baa2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Baa3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 6
Ba1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 2 0 0 0 7
Ba2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 6
Ba3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 4
B1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 3 0 0 0 6
B2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 3
B3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 1 0 5
Caa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 4
ra
tin
g 
M
oo
dy
's
rating estimado - probit ordenado
 
 
 
Standard and Poors – 1999 
 
Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Caa Total
Aaa 2 7 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11
Aa1 3 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
Aa2 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Aa3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
A2 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
A3 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Baa1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Baa2 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
Baa3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 8
Ba1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 6
Ba2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 5
Ba3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 3
B1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 4
B2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 0 1 0 6
B3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 3
Caa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2
ra
tin
g 
S
&
P
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Standard and Poors – 2000 
 
Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Caa Total
Aaa 4 5 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11
Aa1 3 2 1 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
Aa2 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Aa3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
A2 0 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
A3 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Baa1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Baa2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Baa3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 8
Ba1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 5
Ba2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 4
Ba3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 4
B1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 0 1 2 0 0 7
B2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 4
B3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 2 6
Caa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ra
tin
g 
S
&
P
rating estimado - probit ordenado
 
 
 
 
Standard and Poors – 2001 
 
Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Caa Total
Aaa 6 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
Aa1 2 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
Aa2 0 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Aa3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
A2 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
A3 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Baa1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Baa2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Baa3 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 8
Ba1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3
Ba2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 1 1 0 0 0 6
Ba3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 6
B1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 3
B2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 2 1 1 0 7
B3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 3
Caa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 3
ra
tin
g 
S
&
P
rating estimado - probit ordenado
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Standard and Poors – 2002 
 
Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Caa Total
Aaa 7 4 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14
Aa1 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Aa2 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Aa3 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
A1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
A2 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
A3 0 0 0 0 1 4 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
Baa1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Baa2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 5
Baa3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Ba1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 3
Ba2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 1 2 0 0 0 8
Ba3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 4
B1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 5
B2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 4
B3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 5
Caa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 4
ra
tin
g 
S
&
P
rating estimado - probit ordenado
 
 
 
Standard and Poors – 2003 
 
 
Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Caa Total
Aaa 7 4 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15
Aa1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Aa2 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Aa3 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
A1 0 1 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
A2 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
A3 0 0 0 0 1 5 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
Baa1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Baa2 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 7
Baa3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Ba1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4
Ba2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 3 0 0 0 8
Ba3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 3
B1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 3
B2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 0 0 1 6
B3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 1 5
Caa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 4
ra
tin
g 
S
&
P
rating estimado - probit ordenado
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Standard and Poors – 2004 
 
Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Caa Total
Aaa 8 6 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17
Aa1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Aa2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Aa3 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
A1 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
A2 0 0 0 0 4 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
A3 0 0 0 0 2 4 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
Baa1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Baa2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3
Baa3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3
Ba1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 4
Ba2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 3 0 0 0 7
Ba3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 4
B1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 3
B2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 1 5
B3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 5
Caa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 3
ra
tin
g 
S
&
P
rating estimado - probit ordenado
 
 
 
Standard and Poors – 2005 
 
Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Caa Total
Aaa 10 5 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17
Aa1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Aa2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Aa3 1 2 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
A1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
A2 0 0 0 0 5 3 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
A3 0 0 0 0 2 1 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
Baa1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Baa2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4
Baa3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3
Ba1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 4
Ba2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 4
Ba3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 0 1 0 0 0 6
B1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 3
B2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 5
B3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 5
Caa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
ra
tin
g 
S
&
P
rating estimado - probit ordenado
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Standard and Poors – 2006 
 
Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Caa Total
Aaa 11 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17
Aa1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Aa2 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Aa3 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
A1 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
A2 0 0 0 2 4 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11
A3 0 0 0 0 2 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
Baa1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
Baa2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Baa3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Ba1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 4
Ba2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6
Ba3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 5
B1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 5
B2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 4
B3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 3
Caa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
ra
tin
g 
S
&
P
rating estimado - probit ordenado
 
 
Standard and Poors – 2007 
 
Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Caa Total
Aaa 13 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17
Aa1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Aa2 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Aa3 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
A1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
A2 0 0 0 2 5 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13
A3 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Baa1 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
Baa2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Baa3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Ba1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 5
Ba2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 5
Ba3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 7
B1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 6
B2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 4
B3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 3
Caa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ra
tin
g 
S
&
P
rating estimado - probit ordenado
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